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It is possible (albeit unlikely in our view) that rivalrous changes are genuinely invisible in the same color condi-
tion, not merely indiscriminable from objective changes. However, this does not avoid our concerns. If rivalrous
changes are invisible, we will not predict any contrast in frontal activity due to differences in consciously
perceived change: there are no such differences. However, since rivalry still occurs, one interval could contain
at most one extra change in perceptual contents. Yet, since there are multiple matching objective content
changes in both intervals, we again will not predict a measurable difference in BOLD activity. Even more
sensitive analyses of the data (e.g., multivoxel pattern analysis) or more sensitive methods (e.g., electrocorti-
cography), which Brascamp et al. did not use [11], may well still fail to detect such subtle differences.Letter
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A central controversy in consciousness
science concerns whether the neural
correlates of consciousness (NCCs) exclu-
sively reside posterior to the central sulcus
or also include frontal regions [1–4]. In a
recent Trends in Cognitive Sciences
article, Block [5] contends that popular
‘no-report’ paradigms [6,7] cannot settle
this dispute, since absence of report is
consistent with extensive private cogni-
tion. To make progress, we instead re-
quire a ‘no-cognition’ (or more precisely,
‘no-post‐perceptual cognition’) paradigm.
According to Block, doubts about such
approaches [8–10] are misplaced, since
Brascamp et al. [11] have already devel-
oped precisely such a paradigm. Block is
rightly dissatisﬁed with no-report methods.
However, a fundamental difﬁculty faces no-
cognition paradigms, as examination of
Brascamp et al.’s study reveals.
Brascamp et al. exploit binocular rivalry: the
presentation of different stimuli to each eye,
leading to alternating percepts. Speciﬁcally,
they presented each eye with a distinct pat-
tern of quasi-randomly moving dots with
40% motion coherence. These dots
changed direction every 300 ms, creating
an impression of high-tempo jitter in their
global motion. Average dot motion was or-
thogonal across patterns, creating two
types of transition: objective transitions,
where the dots physically changed direction
every 300 ms, and rivalry transitions, where
a switch in eye dominance changed the per-
ceived motion direction every few seconds.
When dots differed in color across eyes,rivalrous transitions were easily detectable.
However, when dots were the same color,
although rivalry transitions still occurred,
observers detected them eight times less
frequently, a level insigniﬁcantly different
from chance. This is plausibly because
such changes, while visible, could not
be distinguished from objective changes in
dot dynamics (i.e., the constant jitter in global
motion). (In Box 1, we discuss the possibility
that such transitions were in fact invisible.)
According to Block, what is theoretically
important is that ‘this method avoids the
systematic change of cognitive states…
that can accompany rivalrous changes’.
Thus, the methodology is ‘not just a no-
report methodology: it is a no-differential-
post-perceptual cognition methodology’.
Yet, Brascamp et al.’s paradigm does
not avoid systematic changes of cognitive
states. All it avoids are thoughts spe-
ciﬁcally tied to rivalrous transitions as
opposed to objective changes in dot
dynamics. Nothing in Brascamp et al.’s
methodology prevents observers engag-
ing in extensive cognitive processing
when transitions occur, so long as similar
processing attends objective changes. In-
deed, Brascamp et al. precisely designed
their displays so that the appearance of
objective change closely matched that of
rivalry-driven change, so we should ex-
pect close similarities. Cognitive process-
ing cannot be expected to distinguish the
subjectively indistinguishable.
This fundamentally compromises Block’s
interpretation of Brascamp et al.’s fMRI
data. Brascamp et al. calculated blood-
oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) contrastsTrbetween intervals inferred to contain a
rivalry transition and intervals inferred
to be transition free in three overlapping
frontoparietal and temporoparietal atten-
tional networks. No evidence was found
that this activation differed from model
predictions, which treated BOLD activa-
tion as a function of transition reportability.
Thus, a large contrast was found in the
different color condition and a much
smaller contrast in the same color condi-
tion. However, this does not indicate an
absence of activity in target regions ac-
companying transitions. It only shows
that this activity does not signiﬁcantly differ
between intervals with and without
transitions. Moreover, since both intervals
contain multiple objective changes
engineered to look just like rivalrous transi-
tions, it is unsurprising if subjects respond
to both intervals in very similar ways. Com-
pared with the different color condition,
where there is a dramatic difference in
the type of change between intervals,
there is effectively no detectable difference
in the same color condition.
What is evidenced by the absence of con-
trast is that frontal areas do not causally
initiate transitions. This was the purpose of
Brascamp et al.’s study. However, we
should not conﬂate the property of causing
transitions with the property of being an
NCC of rivalrous changes or contents. Sen-
sory circuits may determine when changes
between contents occur, even though pre-
frontal circuits are constitutively involved in
our awareness of them. This hypothesis
is consistent with the ﬁnding that invisible
stimuli elicit switches detectable in sensory
cortex but not in frontal regions [12].ends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2019, Vol. xx, No. xx 1
Trends in Cognitive SciencesThis methodological point generalizes
to all studies that subtract activity during
rivalry from activity during a ‘replay’
condition, designed to mimic observers’
percepts during rivalry using a single
external stimulus (e.g., [6]). Such subtrac-
tion methods help determine the etiology
of transitions. However, they are not suit-
able for establishing NCCs [10]. Although
Block partially acknowledges this point
about ‘replay’ subtraction, he does not
appreciate that the issue represents
an in-principle problem for rivalry-based
‘no-cognition’ paradigms. As Block re-
marks, we cannot stop subjects thinking.
At most, we can match their thinking
across conditions (or intervals). However,
to match thinking requires conditions that
are indiscriminable in some relevant re-
spect. Yet, indiscriminable stimuli look
the same. Consequently, all sides will
predict matching frontal activity between2 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month 2019, Vol. xx, No. xxconditions with and without transitions.
Thus, such paradigms cannot discrimi-
nate rival hypotheses concerning NCCs.
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